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ATTEMPTING THE IMPOSSIBLE WHILE IGNORING THE FUNDAMENTAL 
IN RURAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 
by 
Dale W Adams 
Many policy makers believe that rural financial markets 
{RFMs) can be used to alter farmer behavior and allocate 
subsidies to the poor through loan targeting and concessionary 
interest rates. In the following I argue that this is 
impossible, and that imposing these tasks on RFMs subverts the 
fundamental contribution these markets make to development. 
ROLE OF FINANCE IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
The most important role of RFMs in development is 
facilitating the transfer of claims on resources, and ultimately 
resources, from surplus to deficit units. This, in turn, 
accelerates specialization and allows producers to increase 
trade and flex comparative advantage. A simple two-firm example 
may illustrate this point. 
Assume that firms "A" and "B" are too distant from each 
other to make contact through barter or through an informal 
intermediary. Further assume that "A" has too little liquidity 
to capitalize on high marginal returns to productive 
investments, while "B" has excess liquidity and expects low 
marginal rates of return on all intra-firm investments. Without 
financial intermediation, "A" is forced to under-produce for 
want of additional claims on resources, while "B" must consume 
surplus goods or invest them in activities that yield few 
returns. Access to an efficient financial system allows "B" to 
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avoid low return consumption or investment endeavors through 
making deposits with an intermediary. If, in turn, the 
intermediary grants a loan to "A" out of the deposits, 11 A11 can 
use these claims on resources to purchase inputs that increase 
output. 
Fragmented financial markets do not provide these 
connections. If financial markets are repressed, or are shallow 
and connect only a few firms or households, the aggregate losses 
can be substantial when millions of units are involved. 
LIMITATIONS OF RFMS AS FISCAL AGENTS 
Virtually all countries use financial markets to help the 
poor. The Farmers' Home Administration, student loans, and the 
Small Business Administration are examples. In many countries 
cheap loans are the principal government program for the rural 
poor. 
There are three ways in which a loan may help a borrower: 
through the income transfer embodied in the concessionary 
interest rate, through an income transfer realized by borrowers 
who steal the loan, and through the increased net income 
produced by resources bought with borrowed funds. RFMs, 
however, are ill suited, for at least three reasons, to be 
fiscal agents for the poor. First, any income transfer tied to 
a loan is always proportional to the size of the loan: large 
loan, large subsidy; small loan, small subsidy; and no loan, no 
subsidy. Since the size of loan is highly correlated with 
income and assets, loans are a regressive vehicle for 
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redistributing income. Second, these problems are not resolved 
by charging lower interest rates on small than on large loans, 
or by being permissive on loan defaults among borrowers of small 
amounts, while taking a hard line on loan recovery from 
borrowers of large amounts. It is unrealistic to believe that 
those with economic power will long tolerate income transfers in 
which they do not participate. Also, this strategy presents a 
perverse set of incentives to financial intermediaries. On the 
one hand, policy makers tell the intermediary that lending to 
the poor has high priority. On the other hand, to effect the 
income transfer policies are set so that the intermediary is 
forced to charge the lowest interest rates and absorb the most 
defaults on those loans that are most costly to service per unit 
of money lent. This is asking the lender to commit financial 
suicide, regardless of who owns the institution. Lenders who 
fail to cover their costs of lending, capital erosion due to 
inflation, and loan losses with interest receipts become 
mendicant at the public or donor trough, or perish. 
The intermediary's desire to sustain the institution by 
reducing costs coincide with the interests of the economically 
powerful to capture income transfers. These forces collude to 
concentrate cheap loans in the hands of the relatively well-to-
do in most countries under all political systems. There are too 
many dispersed participants in rural financial markets and too 
many transactions for any central authority to force insiders to 
do something against their interests. 
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Deposit disincentives are a third argument against using 
RFMs as fiscal agents. If interest rates are low on loans, 
intermediaries must pay lower rates on deposits. The subsidy 
for the fortunate borrower is paid for by a "tax" on individuals 
who hold deposit accounts that receive a repressed interest 
rate, or by those who would deposit money if the rates were 
higher. The rural poor are affected more by these taxes on 
deposits than are the well-to-do because they have fewer savings 
alternatives. 
Using RFMs as fiscal agents to differentially help the poor 
has effects similar to using a strong laxative to treat a broken 
leg. Not only does the treatment not relieve the problem, but 
it also has important adverse side effects. In most cases, the 
well-to-do end up with the bulk of the benefits transmitted 
through credit, and the poor are denied, not only access to 
cheap credit, but also access to attractive deposits. 
LIMITATIONS OF TARGETED LOANS 
It is also common for governments and donors to target 
loans at enterprises, at inputs, and at investments. These 
loans usually carry inducements such as low interest rates and 
grace periods. The two key assumptions behind loan targeting 
are that individuals can be induced to do what they would 
otherwise not do, or do too slowly, through the offer of 
concessionary loans. And, that most targeted individuals are 
too liquidity-short to make a desirable investment, without a 
loan. 
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Concessionary rediscount lines in central banks are the 
tracks of targeted programs. In some large countries there may 
be hundreds of these lines. Even in small countries it is 
common for the central bank to offer dozens of discount lines. 
Each is aimed at a target group, area, or activity, and each 
carries its own reporting requirements and lending terms. The 
hoped-for results of these loans stem from two effects: 
interest-rates and loan-volume. For example, it is hoped that 
low interest rates on fertilizer loans will induce borrowers to 
use more fertilizer. Or, that concessionary interest rates on 
rice loans will induce borrowers to produce more rice. The key 
assumption here is that the price of the loan directly affects 
the relative profitability of a targeted input, enterprise, or 
investment. 
A critique of the interest-rate-effect argument requires 
understanding sources and uses of liquidity by rural firms. It 
is typical for them to have multiple enterprises and sources of 
income. These enterprises, and the inputs used, have a 
relatively high degree of substitutability. Most farmers decide 
on their mix of enterprises and the proportions of inputs used 
based on product and input prices, plus the contribution of 
inputs to production. 
sources of liquidity. 
Likewise, most farmers have multiple 
Since there is a high degree of 
fungibility among these sources and uses, there is no reason to 
expect a causal relationship between the costs of acquiring 
access to one source of liquidity, and changes in the relative 
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profitability of any input used or product produced. If 
fertilizer use, in the opinion of the farm operator, did not pay 
before obtaining a cheap loan, it still does not pay to use 
fertilizer after obtaining the loan. 
Raising the price of the targeted product, lowering the 
price of the targeted input, or enhancing the productive 
capabilities of inputs are incentives that motivate farmers. 
While cheap credit, combined with high rice prices, will cause 
farmers to produce more rice, realistically priced loans 
combined with high rice prices will give the same result, but 
with less government expense. The price placed on a loan has no 
direct relationship to the relative returns from various 
enterprises or input uses, and, thus, interest rates on loans 
cannot be used to alter the way farmers make decisions about 
production and investment. 
The effect of an increase in loan volume on targeted 
activities is less straight forward. The main assumption behind 
many credit programs is that borrowers need loans to capitalize 
on targeted opportunities. Further, that the targeted activity 
has the highest expected return among all those returns faced by 
the borrower. Thus, if the loan spigot is opened, the borrower 
has the appropriate incentive to channel the borrowed liquidity 
to the activity targeted. Policy makers are often so confident 
of these assumptions that they decree formula loans to fill 
farmers• "credit needs." 
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How much simpler the life of development doctors would be 
if these assumptions mirrored reality. Tremendous diversity, 
rather than simple stereotypes, however, typify rural firms and 
households. One farmer may expect a high marginal rate of 
return from the targeted activity, but expect even higher rates 
from other investments. At the same time, his neighbor may be 
flush with liquidity, face low marginal rates of return from all 
potential investments, including the targeted activity, and 
thus, place priority on using any additional liquidity for 
consumption. The fungibility of financial instruments and the 
possibility for borrowers to exercise financial substitution, 
make it very difficult to isolate cause and effect between loans 
and targeted activities. 
Lending will be positively correlated with increases in 
targeted activities only if loans go to individuals who can 
realize high rates of return on targeted endeavors. Because of 
the thousands of heterogeneous borrowers involved, it is 
impossible for a policy maker in a distant capital to pre-
program how much and who should get these loans. Ultimately, 
the intermediaries must make these decision. 
In sum, the volume effect of loans on the expansion of 
targeted activities is tied to two other factors: (1) the 
relative rates of return borrowers expect from these activities-
-rates that are determined independent of the ebbs and flows in 
the supply of credit. And, (2) how efficiently the lender 
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rations loans to those who have the highest rates of return, a 
topic to which I now turn. 
CONFLICTS BETWEEN TARTETING AND INTERMEDIATION 
Targeting affects lenders in unanticipated ways: it forces 
them to allocate loan subsidies regressively, imposes more 
transactions costs on them, and distorts their innovations. 
Even worse, targeting causes the financial system to be less 
effective in carrying out its normal function of reallocating 
resources among surplus and deficit units. 
Providing rural financial services is expensive, as 
evidenced by the unwillingness of many intermediaries to do it. 
Small transactions, transportation costs, and uncertainties in 
farming nurture these costs. Loan targeting further increases 
these costs through adding lines of credit and reporting, as 
well as distorting the information flowing through financial 
systems. This happens at the expense of loan recovery, 
controlling costs, and discovering cost-reducing technologies. 
Often, for example, the intermediary has up-to-date information 
on the amount of fertilizer supposedly purchased with one of its 
lines of credit, but is unable to determine the recovery status 
of these loans or the intermediary's cost of making them. These 
additional costs reduce the coverage of financial markets, chew 
up resources that might be better used elsewhere, and shackle 
managers with data that are of little use to them. 
When interest rates are controlled, which is common with 
targeting, lenders are forced to shift their transactions costs 
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and increase collateral requirements to ration loans. This 
results in additional hurdles being placed in the way of non-
preferred borrowers: those wanting small loans, first-time 
borrowers, and those with limited collateral. Non-preferred 
borrowers' effective costs for loans are substantially increased 
above levels they would otherwise pay if market rates of 
interest were in force. At the same time, preferred individuals 
who have borrowed previously from the intermediary, those 
requesting large loans, and those with extensive collateral may 
find their loan transactions costs are reduced--their effective 
costs of borrowing are likely to be substantially lower than if 
market rates of interest were charged. This of course means 
that some individuals get more claims on additional resources 
than is justified by their returns to possible investment within 
their firm, and that resources are inefficiently allocated among 
borrowers and potential borrowers. 
Targeting causes similar inefficiencies among surplus 
units. Since rediscount lines often carry concessionary terms, 
it is cheaper for intermediaries to use targeted funds than to 
mobilize deposits. Many rural financial intermediaries have 
little interest in offering deposit services because of these 
strong disincentives. This results in large numbers of rural 
units being denied access to deposits they might otherwise use. 
Surplus firms and households are, as a result, forced to hold 
excesses in forms that provide low returns or to consume them. 
In either case, resources are less efficiently allocated than 
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they would be if financial markets offered attractive deposit 
alternatives to rural units. In extreme cases, extensive loan 
targeting at highly concessionary terms, through rediscount 
lines, destroys the willingness of the financial system to 
intermediate among surplus and deficit units. 
Extensive use of banks and cooperatives as fiscal agents, 
as retail outlets for central banks, and as targeteers also 
undermines professionalism and warps the orientation of the 
institution. Loan officers who mainly handle formula, targeted, 
and politically-conceived loans do not exercise skills necessary 
to lend on the basis of creditworthiness. Also, it is 
difficult for employees to resist tapping, through bribes, 
income transfers that pass through their hands. Extensive use 
of rediscount lines, moreover, forms a patronal financial system 
that sustains itself by transferring favors granted by 
government or donors to borrowers. The reference group for 
managers become the patron above, rather than the borrowers and 
potential depositors below. The former are cultivated, fawned 
over, and flattered, while many members of the latter group are 
treated with contempt inflicted on mendicants. Political 
intrusions into intermediation, plus feasts-and-famines in flows 
of funds through the system, result in overstaffing, serious 
loan recovery problems, and low quality financial services. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is understandable why policy makers often opt for 
concessionary and targeted loans in responding to rural 
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problems: credit programs are easy to start, can be put together 
quickly, transfer subsidies that are hidden, and cause mainly 
latent problems. There would be nothing seriously wrong with 
this if these efforts were somewhat successful and had few bad 
side effects. Unfortunately, loan targeting does little to 
alter borrower behavior in ways desired by policy makers, and 
subsidies transferred through financial markets gravitate to the 
non-poor. Trying the easy, but impossible, through targeting 
and using RFMs as fiscal agents, seriously damages the 
fundamental ability of RFMs to intermediate. Development 
efforts would be both more equitable and efficient if these 
practices were discontinued. 
